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From Rome to Washington: Stoicism and Realpolitik Through the Ages.

Updated: Jun 18



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In the vast panorama of history, few figures continue to illuminate our understanding of power, politics, and philosophy through the ages. Marcus Aurelius, a Roman emperor and devoted Stoic, and Henry Kissinger, a strategist of realpolitik and architect of 20th-century American foreign policy, stand out as emblems of these timeless discussions. Although separated by nearly two millennia, their thoughts and actions resonate with surprising relevance in the contemporary context, offering unique perspectives on the conduct of governance, the ethics of leadership, and the complexity of global affairs.



Introduction


In the history of political thought, few contrasts are as striking as that between the moral philosophy of Stoicism on the one hand, embodied by the Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius, and the pragmatic doctrine of Realpolitik on the other, associated with the American diplomat Henry Kissinger. The one, a sovereign philosopher of the II^e century, left behind intimate Meditations imbued with virtue and universal duty; the other, a strategist of the XX^e century, applied a foreign policy founded on national interest and the balance of power.

How do these two approaches, so distant in time and in principle, converge or clash in the practice of power and crisis management? This essay proposes a critical, cross-analysis of Roman Stoicism and modern Realpolitik – examining their philosophical foundations, their implementation in governance and diplomacy, and their contemporary implications for leadership and crisis management. To this end, we will mobilize academic rigor by drawing on leading historiographical and theoretical sources (Hadot, 1992; Ferguson, 2015; Robertson, 2020; Nye, 2020, etc.), in order to illuminate the dialogue between morality and raison d’État across the ages. The figure of Marcus Aurelius, often cited as the archetype of the Platonic « philosopher-king », and that of Henry Kissinger, frequently described as the paragon of diplomatic realism, will serve as guiding threads to retrace « from Rome to Washington » and to consider what their doctrines can still offer today’s leaders.



Ancient Stoicism and Imperial Power: Marcus Aurelius, the philosopher-emperor


Marcus Aurelius (121-180 CE), Roman emperor and last of the ‘Five Good Emperors’, is remembered as much for the wisdom of his rule as for his philosophical work. A disciple of the Stoic philosophers Epictetus and Seneca, he recorded in his Meditations his personal reflections, without any intention of publication, with the aim of guiding himself toward the good. This practice of constant self-examination, which Pierre Hadot calls the construction of an ‘inner citadel’ of reason and virtue (Hadot, 1992), demonstrates how Marcus Aurelius strove daily to embody the Stoic ideal of the sage upon the throne. Indeed, tradition and ancient historians converge in portraying him as a consummate illustration of the philosopher-king envisioned by Plato. Ancient sources such as the Historia Augusta nickname him ‘the philosopher’, praising the clemency and justice of his reign, and his Stoic collection Meditations remains regarded as a literary monument to a philosophy of service and duty (Philosopher King – Wikipedia).

Governing, from the Stoic standpoint, above all means governing oneself according to universal reason: the emperor must practice the virtues of wisdom, justice, courage, and temperance, serving as an exemplum (moral model) for his people.


On the political level, Marcus Aurelius’ Stoicism manifests as an ethic of moral responsibility and cosmopolitanism. Convinced that every human being is a citizen of the world-state governed by the Logos (Universal Reason), he conceived his imperial power as a service to the common good rather than arbitrary domination. He writes that the sovereign must above all protect the freedom and welfare of his subjects, placing the cause of justice above his personal interest (Philosopher King – Wikipedia). Indeed, the historian Cassius Dio notes that never, during the two decades of his reign (161–180 CE), did Marcus Aurelius abuse his power to persecute the Senate or eliminate political rivals—a rare moderation in an era when imperial cruelty prevailed. This clemency and sense of duty find their source in the Stoic maxim that “if an action is not right, one should not do it; if a statement is not true, one should not say it” (Meditations, XI.27)

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Stoicism indeed provides a rigorous ethical framework: virtue is the only true good, and the aim of politics, as of life, must be to live in accordance with the rational and social nature of human beings.

Confronted with major crises, Marcus Aurelius remained true to these principles while demonstrating a pragmatism illuminated by moral insight. His reign was marked by the Marcomannic Wars on the Danube frontier and, above all, by the Antonine Plague, a devastating pandemic that lasted over fifteen years and decimated the Empire’s population. Far from succumbing to panic or tyranny under the pressure of these trials, the philosopher-emperor put Stoic resilience into practice. In the midst of the epidemic, he penned passages in his Meditations to exhort himself to courage, patience in the face of suffering, and the serene acceptance of events beyond his control (Stoicism in a Time of Pandemic: How Marcus Aurelius Can Help | Classics | The Guardian)

.By doing so, he offered—without knowing it—a genuine ancient crisis-management handbook: The Meditations can be read as a guide to strengthening the mental resilience needed to face a pandemic (Stoicism in a Time of Pandemic: How Marcus Aurelius Can Help – The Guardian). Lucien Jerphagnon noted that “Marcus Aurelius saved the Empire as much by the strength of his character as by that of his legions.” Moreover, the emperor paired his moral reflection with concrete measures dictated by a sense of duty: to fill the ranks depleted by the plague, he did not hesitate to recruit slaves and even auction off treasures from his palace to replenish the public treasury and pay the troops (Marcus Aurelius: the Civil War in the East (Children’s Version) – Donald J. Robertson). This example illustrates the subtle balance Marcus Aurelius achieved between the demands of reality and moral integrity—a balance at the heart of political Stoicism. It is important to emphasize that, for a Stoic, there is no contradiction between acting effectively and acting virtuously: practical reason (phronesis, or prudence) is itself a virtue. Marcus Aurelius thus embodies an ethic of conviction (in the sense of Max Weber) illuminated by responsibility: convinced that only moral good matters, he strove never to transgress his principles while shouldering the burdens of imperial office, however heavy. His reign—often cited as exemplary—demonstrates that governance grounded in moral philosophy is possible even in the most adverse circumstances.



Modern Realpolitik and Great Power Diplomacy: Henry Kissinger, the Pragmatic Strategist



On the apparent opposite of imperial Stoicism, Realpolitik — literally “realistic politics” — represents an approach to statecraft founded on the primacy of reality and power relations, rather than on ethical ideals or abstract legal doctrines. Formulated in the 19ᵉ century by the publicist Ludwig von Rochau and enacted by statesmen such as Bismarck, Realpolitik is defined as the conduct of foreign policy guided above all by concrete circumstances and national interest, rather than by universal moral principles. In this sense, it belongs to the tradition of political realism (Thucydides, Machiavelli) and stands in opposition to Idealpolitik, which seeks to align political action with an ideal of justice or law.


Dr. Henry Kissinger (born 1923), a historian by training and National Security Advisor and then Secretary of State under Presidents Nixon and Ford (1969–1977), is often regarded as the contemporary archetype of the Realpolitik practitioner. In this capacity, his name is frequently associated with the maxim that “the United States has no permanent friends or enemies, only permanent interests” (Ukraine debacle signals the death of Atlanticism – Asia Times). Kissinger himself, nourished by the study of the Austrian diplomat Metternich and the Prussian chancellor Bismarck, maintained that the stability of the international system outweighs narrow moral considerations. During the Cold War, he crafted a resolutely pragmatic American diplomacy: opening relations with Mao’s Communist China in 1972 despite ideological opposition; pursuing détente with the Soviet Union; abandoning certain burdensome allies (such as Taiwan in favor of Beijing, or the nascent Bangladesh in favor of Yahya Khan’s Pakistan)—all decisions driven by the calculation of strategic interests and the balance of power, sometimes at the expense of the democratic values professed by the United States. Kissingerian Realpolitik thus embodies an ethics of means in which the ends—preserving national security, averting nuclear conflict, maintaining American influence—justify morally ambiguous actions, such as supporting anti-communist authoritarian regimes or negotiating with leaders notorious for human-rights abuses.


This subordination of the moral to the political earned Kissinger harsh criticism. Authors such as Christopher Hitchens in The Trial of Henry Kissinger (2001) accuse him of having blood on his hands—whether through the secret bombing of Cambodia, support for Pinochet’s 1973 coup in Chile, or inaction during the massacres in East Timor (Op-Ed: Niall Ferguson: Think Kissinger was the heartless grandmaster of realpolitik? What about Obama? – Los Angeles Times)

.In the collective imagination, Kissinger is often portrayed as a “cynical grandmaster” of Realpolitik, coldly indifferent to human rights. Niall Ferguson, his biographer, calls this image a simplistic caricature (Op-Ed: Niall Ferguson: Think Kissinger was the heartless grandmaster of realpolitik? What about Obama? – Los Angeles Times). The British historian emphasizes, however, that while Kissinger was willing to make immoral compromises, he was by no means devoid of a normative vision. Paradoxically, Ferguson shows that, at least in his intellectual youth, Kissinger saw himself as an “idealist” — as evidenced by the subtitle of his biography (Kissinger 1923–1968: The Idealist). Kissinger himself asserted that “there is no realism without an element of idealism” (Henry A. Kissinger quote: There is no realism without an element of idealism). This declaration, far from trivial, reveals the complexity of his thought: the pursuit of national interest, to be effective in the long term, must incorporate an understanding of values and principles, if only to secure public support and the trust of allies. In other words, a minimum of morality is part of enlightened realist calculation.


It is therefore necessary to qualify the supposedly “amoral” scope of Kissingerian Realpolitik. Some analysts even argue that Kissinger, trained in political philosophy (he wrote on Kant and Metternich at Harvard), devised a sort of morality of Realpolitik. Geopolitician Robert D. Kaplan recalls that Kissinger, shaped by his experience as a young Jew fleeing Nazism, viewed the international order in tragically stark terms: for him, “morality and power could not be dissociated” in the real world of states (The tragedy behind Kissinger’s realpolitik – UnHerd)

From this point of view, he concludes, negotiating a compromise with Beijing or Moscow—even given the authoritarian nature of those regimes—was not a cynical abandonment of Western values, but an ethical lesser evil to avert a global catastrophe. Here we see Max Weber’s ethic of responsibility: the statesman judges his decisions by their foreseeable consequences for the survival and welfare of the community, rather than by the abstract purity of principles. Kissinger embodies this ethic of results, willing to undertake harsh measures to prevent greater evils—whereas Marcus Aurelius embodies the ethic of virtue, preferring to endure adversity rather than compromise his principles.



Morality versus Raison d’État: A Doctrinal Confrontation


The comparative examination of Marcus Aurelius’s Stoicism and Kissinger’s Realpolitik highlights a fundamental tension in political theory : that between the demands of universal morality and the necessities of political action in an imperfect world. On the one hand, Stoic philosophy proposes a demanding conception of virtuous governance : the ruler must strive to align each of his decisions with the imperatives of justice, temperance, and the common good, viewing humanity as one great family governed by rational laws. This vision resembles what Weber calls an « ethic of conviction », namely an ethic that judges actions in light of moral intention and fidelity to absolute values, without concession to contingent results (Éthique de responsabilité et éthique de conviction — Wikipédia). Marcus Aurelius exemplifies this stance by placing integrity above utility : for him, wrongdoing — lying, unjustly punishing, acting selfishly — is never justifiable, whatever the practical consequences.


In contrast, Realpolitik represents a form of teleological ethic, or ethic of responsibility, centered on ends and the effectiveness of the means employed (Éthique de responsabilité et éthique de conviction — Wikipédia).From the realist viewpoint, the survival of the state, the security of the people, and the stability of the international system are higher imperatives that may require compromises with conventional morality. As the cynical French diplomat quoted by Joseph Nye bluntly states, “I define good as whatever serves France’s interests. Morality is out of the question” (Joseph Nye – Wikipedia). This provocative formula conveys the idea that, in the anarchic arena of international relations, raison d’État – the pursuit of national interest through power – is the only reliable compass. For the strict realist, if the end to be achieved is the preservation of peace or power, then effective means become ipso facto legitimate. It is the logic of the “necessary evil,” where one is prepared, for example, to sacrifice the virtue of truth (secret diplomacy, propaganda) or of justice (alliance with a tyrant) to avoid a perceived greater evil (devastating war, enemy domination).


However, the boundary between these two ethics is neither watertight nor definitively exclusive. In theory as in practice, many thinkers and leaders have sought to combine morality and realism. As early as Cicero, in On Duties – Wikipedia, he argued that true utility cannot contradict what is honorable, anticipating the idea that long-term policy cannot prosper by wholly renouncing ethics. More recently, Joseph Nye – Wikipedia proposes a nuanced approach to evaluating foreign policies through a “three-dimensional” framework – intentions, means, consequences – which compels us to assess simultaneously the morality of the motivations, the legality and probity of the means employed, and the results obtained. Nye emphasizes that most international decisions do not concern the immediate survival of the state and involve trade-offs between values (for example, human rights versus economic interests) rather than the application of a cynical survival formula. Ignoring the moral element entirely leads to an impoverished and often counterproductive conception of the national interest. In this sense, even from the standpoint of rational calculation, “values and principles attractive to others are part of the national interest,” Nye notes, on a par with oil or regional security. In other words, a state that integrates trust, reputation, and normative adherence into its strategy (what Nye conceptualizes as “soft power” – Wikipedia) can often achieve its objectives at lower cost than a state relying solely on coercion (“hard power” – Wikipedia) – paradoxically echoing the Stoic intuition that virtue creates its own strength.


Thus, Stoic doctrine and Realpolitik, far from reducing to a sterile opposition between naïve idealism and cold cynicism, can be seen as the two poles of a spectrum along which leaders must navigate. Contemporary political philosophy tends to acknowledge that a synthesis is necessary: effectiveness without ethics leads to the nihilism of power, whereas ethics without effectiveness leads to the impotence of good intentions. From this perspective, Marcus Aurelius and Kissinger offer less a binary choice than a fertile dialectic. One reminds us that power has meaning only if it serves an ideal higher than itself (justice, the common good); the other warns that the noblest ideal can fail if it does not take into account the constraints of reality (force, interests).



Contemporary Implications for Leadership and Crisis Management



In the contemporary era, marked by complex global crises – pandemics, climate change, hybrid conflicts, great-power rivalries – the cross-lessons of Stoicism and Realpolitik remain acutely relevant for political leaders and decision-makers. On the one hand, the revival of Stoicism as a practical philosophy, observable in leadership and corporate circles, reflects the need for a moral and psychological compass in uncertain times. Contemporary authors such as Donald Robertson popularize among managers and executives the idea that Marcus Aurelius’s precepts can forge more resilient leaders, capable of maintaining their composure, mastering their negative emotions, and focusing on their duty in adversity (Stoicism in a Time of Pandemic: How Marcus Aurelius Can Help – The Guardian).

For example, the Stoic notion of the dichotomy of control—distinguishing what depends on us from what does not—proved invaluable for many decision-makers facing the COVID-19 crisis, helping them to accept the inevitable while acting courageously on what was within their power. Likewise, in governance, a leader inspired by Stoicism will emphasize integrity, personal responsibility, and justice, thereby strengthening public trust. Some heads of state even invoked Stoic authorities explicitly: for instance, French President Emmanuel Macron cited Seneca and Marcus Aurelius during the pandemic, calling for patience and unity of the human family in the face of a common ordeal. This renewed interest suggests that ancient wisdom—the primacy of virtue, the selfless service of humanity—still offers vital guidance for enlightened leadership today (Stoicism in a Time of Pandemic: How Marcus Aurelius Can Help – The Guardian).


Contemporary leaders—even those espousing high democratic ideals—face starkly realistic dilemmas: should one trade with authoritarian powers to secure energy prosperity? Should regional stability be prioritized at the expense of human‐rights compromises? These questions admit no simple answers, and it is here that the legacy of Realpolitik supplies indispensable tools: a dispassionate analysis of the interests at stake, anticipation of consequences, and the art of compromise and constrained negotiation. For example, during the Ukrainian crisis that began in 2022, a debate resurfaced between realists and idealists over how to respond to Russian aggression—some invoking the necessity of a pragmatic agreement to restore peace (a logic of balancing interests), others refusing any concession on grounds of justice and law. The tension between these approaches is palpable in foreign ministries: while Europe pursued a policy of moral sanctions against Moscow, some recalled Kissinger’s admonition that “to forget that nations have no permanent friends, only permanent interests, is to court cruel disappointments.” The debate remains open as to where to draw the line between defending values and strategic realism.


Finally, in crisis management, combining the Stoic heritage and Realpolitik can prove highly fruitful. A leader facing a catastrophe—be it health, security, or economic—must demonstrate both the moral rectitude and emotional resilience prized by the Stoics (to maintain cohesion, give meaning to sacrifices, and embody collective values) and the strategic clarity of the realists (to make hard decisions, allocate resources efficiently, and sometimes choose between unavoidable evils). The 2008 financial crisis, for instance, required leaders to communicate with transparency and calm to their citizens (a Stoic approach) while energetically intervening in markets and socializing private losses to save the system (economic Realpolitik pragmatism).

Similarly, when confronted with terrorism, one must both uphold a discourse of principles (defending the rule of law, refusing to yield to fear) and employ less palatable expedient measures (clandestine operations, ad-hoc alliances) to neutralize the threat. The most effective leaders appear to be those who can articulate a mobilizing moral vision while navigating with realism—what has been called “principled pragmatism.” Perhaps this is the joint legacy of Marcus Aurelius and Kissinger: the recognition that in politics, idealism must walk on two legs, one forged from principles and the other from effectiveness.



Conclusion


From Rome to Washington, from the Danubian Limes to the hushed corridors of American diplomacy, we have traversed a historical and conceptual arc linking the wisdom of a philosopher-emperor to the calculated prudence of a contemporary strategist. The comparative study of Stoicism and Realpolitik reveals that politics constantly oscillates between two poles—the pursuit of virtue and the quest for necessity—and that the greatness of statecraft often lies in the ability to reconcile these demands. Marcus Aurelius teaches us, by the example of his life and writings, that power is legitimate only when subject to universal morality and that exemplary leadership draws its strength from character and integrity. Henry Kissinger reminds us, through the controversial legacy of his career, that the international order is tragic, governed by power struggles that cannot be ignored, and that a good intention—however noble—can lead to disaster if it is not suited to reality. Rather than sterilely opposing these two lessons, today’s thinker or decision-maker would do well to integrate them dialectically. As historian Jacques Julliard writes, « politics is the art of the possible that aims at the ideal »—a formulation that could serve as a bridge between the Stoic soul and the realist spirit.

Ultimately, Stoicism and Realpolitik appear less as irreconcilable antipodes than as complementary paths for confronting the challenges of power. One provides an ethical compass—a sense of human purpose without which politics drifts into cynicism or tyranny. The other furnishes a grammar of action—clarity about means without which virtue remains powerless or illusory. Great leaders throughout history—from Marcus Aurelius himself to certain contemporary figures—have often succeeded in marrying, implicitly or explicitly, these two approaches. In the nuclear age and an era of global interdependence, it is more crucial than ever to forge policies that are both effective and just. Finding this delicate balance between Zeno (the founder of Stoicism) and Machiavelli is undoubtedly one of the prerequisites for enlightened leadership in the twenty-first century. It is in this spirit that the study of ideas across the ages—from Rome to Washington—takes on its fullest meaning: not to choose between Marcus Aurelius and Kissinger, but to learn from their combined legacy and to imagine a royal path, both wise and realistic, for the rulers of tomorrow.



Indicative Bibliography


• Marc Aurèle (trad. A. I. Trannoy). (2014). Pensées pour moi-même. Paris : Les Belles Lettres. (Œuvre originale ca. 180).


• Hadot, Pierre. (1992). La citadelle intérieure : Introduction aux Pensées de Marc Aurèle. Paris : Fayard.


• Robertson, Donald. (2019). How to Think Like a Roman Emperor: The Stoic Philosophy of Marcus Aurelius. New York : St. Martin’s Press.


• Robertson, Donald. (25 avr. 2020). « Stoicism in a time of pandemic: how Marcus Aurelius can help ». The Guardian. (Stoicism in a time of pandemic: how Marcus Aurelius can help | Classics | The Guardian) (Stoicism in a time of pandemic: how Marcus Aurelius can help | Classics | The Guardian).


• Ferguson, Niall. (2015). Kissinger: 1923-1968, The Idealist. New York : Penguin Press.


• Kaplan, Robert D. (30 nov. 2023). « The tragedy behind Kissinger’s statecraft ». UnHerd. (The tragedy behind Kissinger's realpolitik - UnHerd) (The tragedy behind Kissinger's realpolitik - UnHerd).


• Kissinger, Henry. (1994). Diplomacy. New York : Simon & Schuster.


• Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (2020). Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump. New York : Oxford University Press. () ().


• Weber, Max. (1919). « Politik als Beruf » (Le métier et la vocation d’homme politique). Dans Gesammelte Politische Schriften. (Traduction française : Le Savant et le Politique, 1959).


• Wikipédia (contributors). (2023). « Philosopher king (roi philosophe) » (Philosopher king - Wikipedia); « Realpolitik » (Realpolitik - Wikipedia); « Éthique de responsabilité et éthique de conviction » (Éthique de responsabilité et éthique de conviction — Wikipédia) (Éthique de responsabilité et éthique de conviction — Wikipédia).



 
 
 

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